Abstract. Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) allows to target the recipients of a message according to a policy expressed as a predicate among some attributes. Ciphertext-policy ABE schemes can choose the policy at the encryption time. In this paper, we define a new property for ABE: homomorphic-policy. A combiner is able to (publicly) combine ciphertexts under different policies into a ciphertext under a combined policy (AND or OR). More precisely, using linear secret sharing schemes, we design Attribute-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (ABKEM) with the Homomorphic-Policy property: given several encapsulations of the same keys under various policies, anyone can derive an encapsulation of the same key under any combination of the policies. As an application, in Pay-TV, this allows to separate the content providers that can generate the encapsulations of a session key under every attributes, this key being used to encrypt the payload, and the service providers that build the decryption policies according to the subscriptions. The advantage is that the aggregation of the encapsulations by the service providers does not contain any secret information.
Introduction
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), introduced by Sahai and Waters [15] , is a generalization of some advanced primitives such as identity-based encryption [2, 16] and broadcast encryption [5] . It gives a flexible way to define the target group of people who can receive the message: encryption and decryption can be based on the user's attributes. This primitive was further developed by Goyal et al. [8] who introduced two categories of ABE: ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) and key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE). In a CP-ABE scheme, the secret key is associated with a set of attributes and the ciphertext is associated with an access policy over the universe of attributes: a user can decrypt a given ciphertext if he holds the attributes that satisfy the access policy underlying the ciphertext. KP-ABE is the dual to CP-ABE in the sense that an access policy is encoded into the users secret key, and a ciphertext is computed with respect to a set of attributes: the ciphertext is decryptable by a user only if the attributes in the ciphertext satisfy the user's access policy. CP-ABE and KP-ABE consider different scenarios. In KP-ABE, the encryptor has no control over who has access to the data he encrypts. This is the key-issuer who generates and controls the appropriate keys to grant or deny access to the users. In contrast, in CP-ABE, the encryptor is able to decide who should or should not have access to the data that he encrypts. In the applications we target such as Pay-TV, this would mean that the access control is either dynamically managed by the encryptor (with a ciphertext-policy ABE) or statically managed by the key-issuer (with a key-policy ABE), while in real-life a third-party could be in charge of a dynamic policy.
Fine-Grained Access Control Over the last few years, there has been a lot of progress in constructing secure and efficient ABE schemes from different assumptions and for different settings [1, 3, 4, 6-9, 12-15,17] , to name a few. The Sahai-Waters' scheme [15] produces ciphertexts decryptable when at least k attributes overlapped between a ciphertext and a private key. While they showed that this primitive is useful for error-tolerant encryption with biometrics, the lack of expressibility limits its applicability to more general systems. Fine-grained access control systems [8] facilitate granting differential access rights to a set of users and allow flexibility in specifying the access rights of individual users. Several techniques are known for implementing fine-grained access control. In our work, we focus on fine-grained access control which are expressed by logic formulas and we rely on the standard Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) access structures, first considered in the context of ABE by Goyal et al. [8] .
Homomorphic-Policy Attribute-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
In KP-ABE, the access policy is controlled at the key generation phase. In CP-ABE, the access policy is controlled at the message encryption phase. We go a step further in this consideration by postponing the management of the access policy to a later phase and show how one can manage the access policies without knowing any secret nor the content of message.
Previous works on CP-ABE consider classical encryption: the encryptor, taking as input an access policy and a message, produces a corresponding ciphertext. The encryptor thus manages both the access policy and the encryption of the original message. This scenario is unavoidable when limiting the access policy as a single atomic attribute characterizing a user's identity (e.g., identity-based encryption) or a target group of users (e.g., identity-based broadcast encryption) because the encryptor needs to know the message to encrypt with the single attribute. However, in the general case, where the access policy is composed from sub-policies via AND and OR operators, the encryption of a message for the whole access policy can be computed from the ciphertexts of the sub-policies, without the knowledge of the original message.
The ability to produce a ciphertext for an access policy without the knowledge of the message itself can give significant impact in concrete applications. Considering Pay-TV, we can now separate the roles of the content provider and of the manager of the access policies, as shown in the Figure 1 : the content provider (C) encapsulates a unique session key K for each attribute, encrypts the content under this session key K, and provides that to the manager of the access policies (A). The latter broadcasts the encrypted content, but according to the access policy, it combines the appropriate encapsulations to produce a unique encapsulation, to be broadcast to the users (the recipients (R)). Each authorized user can decrypt this encapsulation (by owning attributes satisfying the access policy) and get the session key to decrypt the content. Technically, in order to implement the above principle, we need to define Attribute-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (ABKEM) which encapsulate a session key for an access policy. Then, the combination of two encapsulations under the same session key to an encapsulation for the composed access policy is completed via the homomorphic-policy property: if we have encapsulations of a session key under two policies p 1 and p 2 , we will be able to produce an encapsulation of the same session key for the policies p 1 ∨ p 2 and p 1 ∧ p 2 . The achievement of an homomorphic-policy ABKEM is the main contribution of this paper.
Contribution
As explained above, our main contribution is the definition and construction of HomomorphicPolicy Attribute-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (HP-ABKEM). To this aim -we focus on homorphic policy and define attribute-based key encapsulation mechanisms (ABKEM). Our construction of ABKEM relies on the Lewko-Waters ABE scheme [10] . ABKEM is very convenient to be used with a Data Encapsulation Method (DEM) for practical applications which encrypt large contents or streams of data, such as the case of Pay-TV. -we propose homomorphic-policy methods to combine ciphertexts for AND and OR operations on policies. Our technique exploits special properties of LSSS for AND and OR operations and transforms them in an efficient way of combining the corresponding encapsulations. -we then propose an efficient randomization method for making any ciphertext (possibly obtained from the above combinations) statistically indistinguishable from a fresh ciphertext targeting the same policy. This is important for the security of the system.
Putting altogether, our final result gives an HP-ABKEM which is as efficient as the Lewko-Waters ABE system.
Our Technique
While the homomorphic property for two group laws over the encrypted messages (usually called fully homomorphic property) is quite difficult to achieve. Fortunately, achieving homomorphic policy seems much more easy and efficient. Our technique exploits specific structures of the LSSS-matrix and carries them on the combination of encapsulations. The OR operation is relatively easy to get, because it essentially corresponds to a concatenation of the encapsulations. However, the AND operation does require a particular property on the LSSS-matrix, that we explain below.
Let us first briefly summarize the general method of constructing an LSSS-based ABE, adapted to an ABKEM. For any policy p, expressed as a logic formula, an LSSS-matrix A ∈ K m×n is generated such that each line x ∈ {1, . . . , m} corresponds to an attribute, and from a set of attributes that satisfies the policy p, one can do a linear combination on the corresponding lines of the matrix A to reconstruct the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0). One then sets #» v ← (s, $, . . . , $) t and the share-vector #» ν ← A · #» v for the secret s, where the vector #» v is completed with random components. A linear combination that reconstructs the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) leads to the same linear combination on the share-vector #» ν = A · #» v that reconstructs the secret s. One can thus encapsulate each element of the vector #» ν so that a legitimate user can reconstruct the session key e(g, g) s in a pairing-friendly setting. Now, from an encapsulation for the policy p 1 with the session key e(g, g) s 1 and an encapsulation for the policy p 2 with the session key e(g, g) s 2 , our objective is to produce an encapsulation for the policy p 1 ∧ p 2 with the session key e(g, g) s 1 +s 2 . We first observe a property on the LSSS-matrix: with the LSSS-matrix A 1 ∈ K m×n associated to the policy p 1 and the LSSS-matrix A 2 ∈ K m×n associated to the policy p 2 , the LSSS-matrix of A associated to a policy p 1 ∧ p 2 is of the following form:
where for any A, we denote A 1 the first column and A * the matrix A without the first column (i.e., A = A 1 A * ).
Looking at the first and the second column of the matrix A ∧ , the vector A 1 1 is repeated twice in the upper part, and in the bottom part, the corresponding block is 0 − A 1 2 . Therefore, if we put s 1 + s 2 and −s 2 as the two first components of the vector #» v , when combining the resulting share-vector according to the known attributes, the upper part will first lead to the secret s 1 + s 2 − s 2 = s 1 and the bottom part will lead to the secret −s 2 . Consequently, in order to produce the encapsulation of s 1 + s 2 under A ∧ , we only need to combine the encapsulation of s 1 in A 1 and the encapsulation of s 2 in A 2 . The resulting share-vector is A · (s 1 + s 2 , −s 2 , $, . . . , $) t . However, as one could recover individually the secret s 1 + s 2 and −s 2 with the appropriate attributes in each sub-policies, but not necessarily for the same user, a collusion attack is possible. We thus need a final randomization step to glue everything together.
Finally, it is interesting to remark that performing homomorphic policy does not introduce any extra cost for the final encapsulation, compared to producing an encapsulation from scratch for the same final policy.
Definitions

Access Structure
For any application with limited access, one needs to define the access structure, which precises which combinations of conditions grant access to the data or to the system. Definition 1 (Access Structure). Let P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m } be a set of parties (human players or attributes). An access structure in P is a collection A ⊆ 2 P \{∅}. The sets in A are called the authorized sets, while the others are called unauthorized sets.
When some minimal sets of parties are required to access the system (but any superset is good too), only monotone access structures make sense, since one can always ignore any supplementary party.
Definition 2 (Monotone Access Structure).
Let P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m } be a set of parties and A an access structure in P. A is said monotone if, for any subset B ⊆ C ⊆ P, when B ∈ A then C ∈ A.
Linear Secret Sharing Scheme
In order to control access rights according to a monotone access structure, the use of a secret sharing scheme that spreads the secret key among several players is a classical technique. One must use a secret sharing scheme that just allows authorized sets to reconstruct the secret key. This is even better if the secret key is never fully reconstructed, but just in a virtual way to run the restricted process (such as signature or decryption).
Definition 3 (Secret Sharing Scheme).
A secret sharing scheme over a set of parties P, for an access structure A over P, allows to share a secret s among the players, with shares ν 1 , . . . , ν m such that:
-any set of parties in A can efficiently reconstruct the secret s from their shares; -any set of parties not in A has no information about the secret s from their shares.
A linear secret sharing scheme is quite appropriate to share a secret key in order to run the restricted process in a distributed way, since many cryptographic primitives have such linear properties.
Definition 4 (LSSS).
A Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) over a field K and a set of parties P is defined by a share-generating matrix A ∈ K m×n and a labeling map ρ : {1, . . . , m} → P according to the access policy A: for any I ⊂ {1, . . . , m}, anyone can efficiently find a vector #» c ∈ K m with support I such that #» c t · A = (1, 0, . . . , 0) if and only if ρ(I) ∈ A.
In order to share s ∈ K, one chooses v 2 , . . . , v n $ ← K and sets #» v ← (s, v 2 , . . . , v n ) t , then the share-vector is #» ν ← A· #» v . One would like to be able to reconstruct s from a few coordinates of this share-vector is #» ν . Being able to find such a vector #» c with support I is equivalent to reconstruct s for the players satisfying ρ(I) only:
To give an example, we can refer to the LSSS proposed by Lewko-Waters [10] . It generates the matrix A and the map ρ from any monotone policy p that is encoded as a boolean tree, with binary AND and OR gates. One does not need to handle NOT gates, since one only considers monotone policies. It is recalled in Appendix A. We describe it with matrices in Section 4.3, with the proof in Appendix B.
Attribute-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism
In this paper, we extend ABE to Attribute-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ABKEM), where the ciphertext encapsulates a session key, later used to encrypt the payload, in a symmetric way.
Definition 5 (ABKEM).
An attribute-based key encapsulation mechanism (ABKEM) over an attribute space A is defined by four algorithms:
-Setup(λ): Takes as input the security parameter, and outputs the master secret key msk and the public key pk; -KeyGen(msk, id, a): Takes as input the master secret key msk, the identity id of a player, and an attribute a ∈ A, to output the private decryption key dk a id for this attribute a; -Encaps(pk, p): Takes as input the public key pk and a policy p, to output a key K and an encapsulation E of this key; -Decaps(dk, E): Takes as input a decryption key and an encapsulation E, to output the encapsulated key K or ⊥.
A decryption key will indifferently mean a key dk a id for a specific user id and a specific attribute a, or a set dk A id of keys specific to a user id, but for many attributes a ∈ A ⊂ A. The correctness property is: for any (msk, pk) ← Setup(λ), dk id = {dk a id ← KeyGen(msk, id, a)} a∈A , and (K, E) ← Encaps(pk, p), Decaps(dk id , E) = K if A satisfies the policy p. The main security property is the usual indistinguishability (IND), which should prevent collusions of adaptively chosen players, that can also get decryption keys for adaptively chosen attributes:
Let us consider an ABKEM over an attribute space A. No adversary A should be able to break the following security game against a challenger:
-Initialization: the challenger runs the setup algorithm (msk, pk) ← Setup(λ), and provides pk to the adversary A; -Key Queries: the adversary A can ask KeyGen-queries, for any id and any attribute a of its choice to get dk a id ; -Challenge: the adversary A provides a policy p to the challenger that runs (K, E) ← Encaps(pk, p), and sets K b ← K and K 1−b as a random key, for a random bit b. It provides (E, K 0 , K 1 ) to the adversary; -Key Queries: the adversary A can again ask KeyGen-queries of its choice; -Finalize: the adversary A outputs its guess b on the bit b.
We also define the event Cheat, which means that a user (with some identity id) owns a set of attributes A (the set of all the attributes a asked to a Key Query for id) that satisfies p: in such a case, the adversary can trivially guess b. Hence, we only allow adversaries such that Pr[Cheat] = 0. We then define Adv
, and say that an ABKEM is (t, ε)-adaptively secure if no adversary A running within time t can get Adv ind (A) ≥ ε.
We stress that everything is adaptive in this definition: the identity and the attributes asked to the key queries, and the policy asked for the challenge query. However, we are in the chosen-plaintext scenario, without access to any decryption/decapsulation oracle.
of K under a combination p = p 1 ∧ p 2 or p = p 1 ∨ p 2 from the encapsulations of K under the policies p 1 and p 2 on the attributes in A, without knowing K (which has already been used to encrypt the payload).
With such an homomorphism on the policies, from the encapsulations of a common key K under all the attributes a ∈ A, one could publicly generate an encapsulation of K under any policy on A: as illustrated on Figure 2 , from the encapsulations {E i } i of K for the attributes A = {a i }, one can derive the encapsulation E p of K under any policy p, encoded as a binary tree with AND (∧) and OR (∨) gates. Again, we only consider monotone policies, hence the absence of NOT gates. On attributes, if one wants to consider the negation (or absence) of some attribute a, one has to define a second attribute a that is exclusive with a, so that, if p = (a), then ¬p = (a ).
To achieve this goal, we just need to be able to combine two encapsulations of K under p 1 and p 2 in order to derive the encapsulation of K under p ∨ = p 1 ∨ p 2 and under p ∧ = p 1 ∧ p 2 . The global encapsulation under a more general policy can then be recursively built.
Definition 7 (HP-ABKEM).
An homomorphic-policy attribute-based key-encapsulation mechanism (HP-ABKEM) over an attribute space A is an ABKEM (see Definition 5), with a more specific encapsulation algorithm and two additional algorithms for the homomorphism:
-Encaps(pk, P ): Takes as input the public key pk, a list of policies P = (p i ) i , to output a key K and the encapsulations E i of this key under the policies p i 's; -Combine(pk, gate, E 1 , E 2 ): Takes as input the public key pk as well as two encapsulations E 1 and E 2 , and a gate gate ∈ {∧, ∨}, to output an encapsulation under the combination of the initial policies for E 1 and E 2 ; -Rand(pk, E) Takes as input the public key pk as well as an encapsulation, to output a new encapsulation (of the same key under the same policy).
The intuition behind the new Encaps algorithm is that we want to be able to encapsulate the same key K under various policies. We thus opt for an encapsulation algorithm that takes as input all the policies. The correctness properties are:
are common encapsulations of a key K under the p i 's, then for any i, j, E ← Combine(pk, gate, E i , E j ) is an encapsulation of the same key K, but under the policy p = p i gate p j ; -for any encapsulation E of some key K under a policy p, E ← Rand(pk, E) follows the same distribution as a fresh encapsulation of K under the policy p.
Note that we do not expect the combination to hide the structure of the initial encapsulations. The randomization will do this work, but there is no need to do it at each step, hence the separation of the two processes: one will iteratively combine the encapsulations in order to obtain the encapsulation under the appropriate policy, and then the randomization will finalize the process (see Figure 3) .
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Security
As explained in the Pay-TV scenario in the introduction, we have three players: the content provider (or the sender), the manager of the access policy (or the combiner) and the receiver. We thus expect the sender to encapsulate a key K under all the attributes, and to encrypt the payload under K; the combiner then generates the encapsulation of K under the appropriate policy; so that only the legitimate receivers can decapsulate and decrypt the payload. When the adversary plays the role of the receivers, the required security notion is exactly the previous indistinguishability: given several keys for various attributes, and even several identities (to model collusions), an adversary should not be able to get any information about a key encapsulated under a policy that is not satisfies by any of the users under its control.
On the other hand, the sender does not want to trust the combiner: while the former sends K encapsulated under many attributes (or more generally many policies), the latter should not be able to distinguish K from a random key. Hence the new indistinguishability with multiple encapsulations (m − IND), but without being able to get any decryption key, hence the no-key attack (NKA).
-Initialization: the challenger runs the setup algorithm (msk, pk) ← Setup(λ), and provides pk to the adversary A; -Challenge: the challenger runs (K, (E i ) i ) ← Encaps(pk, A), and sets K b ← K and K 1−b as a random key, for a random bit b. It provides ((E i ) i , K 0 , K 1 ) to the adversary; -Finalize: the adversary A outputs its guess b on the bit b. We stress that now, nothing is adaptive, since the adversary cannot get decryption keys, but gets the encapsulations of the same key K under all the individual attributes. We also remain in the chosen-plaintext scenario, without access to any decryption/decapsulation oracle. In addition, since the adversary is the combiner that receives the key K encapsulated under every attribute, we do not allow any collusion with a user: any attribute would be enough to get K and break the security game. In real-life, such a combiner would not be a critical party since it does not know any long-term secret. An ephemeral corruption would just impact the privacy of the ephemeral content.
Construction
Modified Lewko-Waters Scheme
We present here a revised version of the ABE scheme from [10] . We actually relax it in two ways: we do not exploit the decentralized version and so we consider that all the attributes are managed by the same entity (but we could keep the decentralized version); we consider a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) instead of an encryption scheme, which just encaps a session key. However, we still use an LSSS to realize the access policy, and pairing techniques to ensure collusion resilience: we consider a symmetric pairing e : G × G −→ G T , where the groups G and G T will be of composite order N = q 1 q 2 q 3 , with three large prime integers q 1 , q 2 , and q 3 . Let us first describe our variant of ABKEM.
Description
-Setup(λ): One first generates a symmetric pairing e : G × G −→ G T for groups of composite order N = q 1 q 2 q 3 (of length λ). One also generates a generator g 1 of the subgroup G 1 ⊂ G of order q 1 and a hash function H : {0, 1} * −→ G. Then, for each attribute a, the authority specifies the pair of secret/public keys, respectively sk a = (α a , y a ) and pk a = (G a = e(g 1 , g 1 ) αa , g a = g ya 1 ). The master secret key msk is the concatenation of the sk a 's, and the public key pk contains N , g 1 and H, together with the concatenation of the pk a 's.
-KeyGen(msk, id, a): From msk = {sk a }, id and a, the authority outputs dk
-Encaps(pk, P ): From the public key pk and a set P of policies, one first chooses some random s $ ← Z N and sets the symmetric encapsulated key K ← e(g 1 , g 1 ) s . Then, for each p ∈ P , we process the following encapsulation: from the LSSS matrix A ∈ K m×n and the associated labeling map ρ onto the attributes describing the access structure defined by the policy p, we set #» v = (s, v 2 , . . . , v n ) and #» w = (0, w 2 , . . . , w n ), with v k , w k $ ← Z N for k = 2, . . . , n and #» r $ ← Z m N . We build the share vectors #» ν = A · #» v and #» ω = A · #» w. Eventually, for each line x ∈ {1, . . . , m} of the matrix A, we construct the encapsulation using the keys pk ρ(x) = (G ρ(x) , g ρ(x) ) associated to the attribute a x = ρ(x) involved in the policy p:
The algorithm returns E p = {(E 1,x , E 2,x , E 3,x )} x for each p ∈ P . -Decaps(dk id , E p ), where dk id = (dk a id ) for the attributes owned by id: First, the user must find a vector #» c ∈ K m such that #» c t · A = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and the support I of the non-zero components of #» c links to a set of attributes owned by the user. Then, for each x ∈ I, the user computes
id , E 2,x ). He finally gets K by combining with the vector #» c :
The latter reconstruction works since
In addition, for each x ∈ I,
And so, the final combination leads to
One should note that for this construction to work, the map ρ needs to be an injection. In practice, this is not a real issue, since one can simply duplicate the attributes and provide multiple keys to users.
Construction of the LSSS
In this section, we detail a construction of the LSSS, in an iterative way, from a boolean tree (with only OR and AND gates). First, we have to start from an LSSS for a simple policy p = (a i ), for some i (i.e., a unique attribute):
Then we explain how to combine two policies p 1 and p 2 , represented by the LSSS's (A 1 , ρ 1 ) and (A 2 , ρ 2 ) respectively, into the policies
In the following, for any A, we denote A 1 the first column et A * the matrix A without the first column (i.e., A = A 1 A * ). Proposition 9. Let (A 1 , ρ 1 ) and (A 2 , ρ 2 ) be two LSSS's for the policies p 1 and p 2 . Then we can build the LSSS's (A ∧ , ρ ∧ ) and (A ∨ , ρ ∨ ) for the policies p ∧ = p 1 ∧ p 2 and p ∨ = p 1 ∨ p 2 as follows
If we label the rows of the matrices from 1 to m 1 + m 2 , where A 1 ∈ K m 1 ×n 1 and A 2 ∈ K m 2 ×n 2 , we have
This construction is not really new, since it was described in [11] in a more generic way. We need this explicit description for the security analysis of our ABKEM. The correctness of this LSSS construction is provided in the Appendix B. Up to a re-ordering of the rows and columns of the matrices, this is also the same construction obtained from the algorithm presented in the Appendix A from [10] . A comparison of the two methods is indeed proposed in the Appendix C.
Homomorphic Policy
Our main goal is now to show that this iterative construction of the LSSS can be applied to our ABKEM, starting from encapsulations of the same key K under every attribute. This will follow from the homomorphic-policy property. We recall that in the ABKEM, #» ν = A · #» v is a secret sharing of a random scalar s, while #» ω = A · #» w is a secret sharing of 0, the components ν x and ω x being hidden in E 1,x and E 3,x by G rx ρ(x) and g rx ρ(x) respectively. Because of the linear property of the LSSS, by concatenating or by adding the shared, we either obtain the OR or the AND policies of two encapsulations E (1) and E (2) :
Of course, the same applies on the shares #» ω of 0, but we focus on the shares #» ν of the random s
One Secret under two Policies Let us be given two encapsulations E (1) and E (2) of the same secret value K = e(g 1 , g 1 ) s under the policies p 1 and p 2 , represented by the LSSS (A 1 , ρ 1 ) and (A 2 , ρ 2 ). The construction thus used, for i = 1, 2, the share-vectors
From attributes satisfying p i , under the LSSS property, one can efficiently find a vector
. By multiplying this vector on the appropriate half of #» ν , one can get s:
It will be used for the disjunction of policies.
Two Secrets under different Policies Let us be given two encapsulations E (1) and E (2) of two secret values K 1 = e(g 1 , g 1 ) s 1 and K 2 = e(g 1 , g 1 ) s 2 under the policies p 1 and p 2 , represented by the LSSS (A 1 , ρ 1 ) and (A 2 , ρ 2 ) .
The construction thus used, for i = 1, 2, the share-vectors
. This combination will be used for the conjunction of policies, but only with the same secret. Note that the produced encapsulation must be randomized to perform the new policy, otherwise there is a colluding attack: with independent keys for each policy, two players can independently get s 1 and s 2 , and can then combine them to get s 1 + s 2 .
Two Secrets under the same Policy Let us be given two encapsulations E (1) and E (2) of two secret values K 1 = e(g 1 , g 1 ) s 1 and K 2 = e(g 1 , g 1 ) s 2 under the same policy p, represented by the LSSS (A, ρ) . The construction thus used the share-vectors #» ν 1 and #» ν 2 of the random scalars s 1 and s 2 respectively under the same policy p. Then, one can see #» ν = #» ν 1 + #» ν 2 as a share-vector of s = s 1 + s 2 under the policy p, since #» ν = A · ( #» v 1 + #» v 2 ). Indeed, from attributes satisfying p, one can efficiently find a vector #» c ∈ K m such that #» c t · A = (1, 0, . . . , 0):
This combination will be used for the randomization, with s 2 = 0.
Security
In [10] , Lewko and Waters proved their ABE scheme to be indistinguishable under several assumptions on the composite order pairing and the condition that ρ is injective. This easily leads to the IND security for the above variant of ABKEM, even for adaptive KeyGen-queries. Hence, this ABKEM construction achieves the IND security level. In addition, if one looks at the above construction of the LSSS-matrix, for p = a 1 ∨ . . . ∨ a k , then A = (1, . . . , 1) t and #» ν = (s, . . . , s) t : from an encapsulation E of the key K = e(g 1 , g 1 ) s under the policy p, one can easily extract the encapsulations E i of the same K, under the policies p i = (a i ) respectively: indeed, each triple (E 1,x , E 2,x , E 3,x ) is a simple encapsulation of K under a x = ρ(x).
Hence, from the security result of their ABE, we also get the m − IND security of our variant, if the keys obtained by the adversary do not satisfy any of the sub-policies p 1 or p 2 . In our m − IND − NKA security level, no keys can be obtained.
As already noted, in [10] , Lewko and Waters assume a one-use restriction on attributes throughout the proof: this means that the row labeling map ρ of the challenge ciphertext access matrix (A, ρ) must be injective. The reason is that, if an attribute is used twice in the access matrix, then there will appear an implicit relation between the randomnesses associated to the corresponding two lines of the matrix and the proof does not go through anymore. To overcome this issue, Lewko and Waters suggested to associate k independent attributes to any attribute a, where k is the bound number of use of a in a policy. Our scheme inherently has the same limitation.
Homomorphic Policy
Let us now see how this impacts on the encapsulations, when one wants to do disjunctions and conjunctions of policies.
Disjunctions Let us be given two encapsulations E (1) and E (2) of the same key K = e(g 1 , g 1 ) s under the policies p 1 and p 2 , represented by the LSSS (A 1 , ρ 1 ) and (A 2 , ρ 2 ). We want to make an encapsulation of K under the policy p 1 ∨ p 2 . Using the construction of the share-vectors from Section 4.4, which applies on both #» ν 1 , #» ν 2 and #» ω 1 , #» ω 2 , we know that the resulting encapsulation should use
As a consequence, the resulting encapsulation is
j,x ) j=1,2,3 } x∈A .
Conjunctions Let us be given two encapsulations E (1) and E (2) of the same key K = e(g 1 , g 1 ) s under the policies p 1 and p 2 , represented by the LSSS (A 1 , ρ 1 ) and (A 2 , ρ 2 ). We want to make an encapsulation of K under the policy p 1 ∧ p 2 . Using the construction of the share-vectors from Section 4.4, which applies on both #» ν 1 , #» ν 2 and #» ω 1 , #» ω 2 , we know that the resulting encapsulation should use
However, this will contain the key K 2 = e(g 1 , g 1 ) 2s . We thus have to use square-roots to avoid that: the resulting encapsulation is
j,x ) 1/2 ) j=1,2,3 } x∈A . Note that even if in the Lewko-Waters' construction there is a modulus N = q 1 q 2 q 3 that is hard to factor, this is the order of the group. Hence g 1/2 = g α where α = (N + 1)/2.
As already noted, collusion is possible. But this is even worse in this case since we are using s = s 1 = s 2 : just satisfying one of the two policies, one can recover K 1/2 = e(g 1 , g 1 ) s/2 , which thereafter easily leads to K. We thus need to randomize the encapsulation, in order to glue together the policies.
Randomization If one looks in details the description of the Encaps algorithm, there are 4 kinds of randomness:
N . Let us start from any encapsulation E (1) of K under a policy p, with
for each a x = ρ(x) involved in the policy p, where #» ν (1) = A · #» v (1) and #» ω (1) = A · #» w (1) . We now define a new fresh encapsulation E (2) :
where #» ν (2) = A · #» v (2) and #»
. . , n, and #» r (2) $ ← Z m N . This is actually a fresh random encapsulation of K (2) = 1 G T under the policy p. It can be computed from the public key pk that contains N , g 1 , and the keys pk a = (G a , g a ), for all the attributes, as would be generated a fresh encapsulation of
Eventually, the new encapsulation E = {(E
2,x · E
2,x , E
3,x · E
3,x )} x is a truly random encapsulation of the same K under the policy p.
Conclusion
We proposed a new feature for ABE, with the homomorphic policy. It allows to separate the roles of the sender and the access right manager. This is already a very interesting property in the Pay-TV context. One limitation is the need to know the policies when operating the crucial randomization steps. In our construction, we thus assume the policy is implicitly provided with the encapsulation. Providing a randomization independent to the policy is an open problem. Such a solution, or even the hidden policy property, would find even more application, as the management of medical files, where the doctor can add an access restriction to a patient's file without knowing the original access policy.
The last block of n 2 − 1 components is also also (0, . . . , 0).
In the other direction, in order to be able to distinguish s from a random value, given the coordinates of #» ν in I, one must be able to find #» c such that #» c t · A ∨ = (1, 0, . . . , 0), with support I. Of course, we can split #» c = #» c 1 #» c 2 .
As a consequence, #» c t 1 · A 1 1 + #» c t 2 · A 1 2 = 1 and #» c t 1 · A * 1 = (0, . . . , 0) and #» c t 2 · A * 2 ) = (0, . . . , 0). At least, one of the two elements #» c t 1 · A 1 1 or #» c t 2 · A 1 2 is non-zero. Let us assume this is the first one, and it is equal to α ∈ K * : the vector
. This vector has a support I ⊆ I, and thus (from the LSSS property) ρ(I ) must satisfy the policy p 1 , and so does ρ(I) because of the monotonicity.
Conjunctions We assume that for some attributes A, there is I such that ρ(I) ⊂ A satisfies the policy p 1 ∧ p 2 . This also means there is I b ⊆ I such that ρ(I b ) ⊂ A satisfies the policy p b , for
This vector #» c has a support I 1 ∪ I 2 ⊆ I.
In the other direction, in order to be able to distinguish s from a random value, given the coordinates of #» ν in I, one must be able to find #» c such that #» c t · A ∧ = (1, 0, . . . , 0). Of course, we can split #» c = #» c 1 #» c 2 :
#» c t · A ∧ = ( #» c Then #» c t 1 · A 1 1 = 1 and #» c t 1 · A 1 1 − #» c t 2 · A 1 2 = 0, which also implies #» c t 2 · A 1 2 = 1; #» c t 1 · A * 1 = (0, . . . , 0) and #» c t 2 · A * 2 = (0, . . . , 0). We thus have both #» c t 1 · A 1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and #» c t 2 · A 2 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and the supports of #» c 1 and #» c 2 are I 1 and I 2 included in I. From the LSSS property ρ(I b ) must satisfy the policy p b , for b = 1, 2, and so does ρ(I) because of the monotonicity. As a consequence, ρ(I) satisfies the policy p 1 ∧ p 2 .
C Construction of the LSSS
In this section, we illustrate the two methods to construct the LSSS for the policy p = ((a 1 ∨ a 2 ) ∧ (a 3 ∧ a 4 )) ∨ (((a 5 ∨ a 6 ) ∧ a 7 ) ∨ a 8 ).
Using our combination of matrices, starting from the leaves, associated to the matrix [1] , and going go back to the root, we obtain the construction on Figure 4 .
Using Lewko-Waters' algorithm, we get the tree and the matrix described on Figure 5 . This algorithm explores the tree following nodes corresponding to binary gates (i) and associates vectors with values in {−1, 0, 1} to the child nodes. The vectors linked to leaves form the final matrix.
The matrices obtained are equivalent: columns can just differ with the sign. Indeed, if there exists #» c such that #» c t · A = (1, 0, . . . , 0), changing the sign of a column of A does not impact the a1 : [1] a2 : [1] a3 : [1] a4 : [1] a5 : [1] a6 : [1] a7 : [1] a8 : [ The matrices also have the same size: m rows for n + 1 columns where m is the numbers of literals in the predicate p and n is the number of AND gates. If this is well known for the matrices made from Lewko-Waters's method, it is easy to see it with our method too, by induction. Let A 1 and A 2 be two LSSS matrices, with respectively n 1 and n 2 columns, for the policies p 1 and p 2 , with respectively n 1 and n 2 AND gates. Following our construction, the new LSSS matrices A ∨ and A ∧ have respectively n 1 + n 2 and n 1 + n 2 + 1 columns, and their associated policies p 1 ∨ p 2 and p 1 ∧ p 2 respectively have n 1 + n 2 and n 1 + n 2 + 1 AND gates. Note that we start from the atomic predicates p = (a i ), and we assume them all being distinct.
